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Abstract 
 
The post-Cold War political map displays three major developments, which deserve close 
attention: the global expansion of democracy; the growth and changing nature of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); and the evolution of corruption and anticorruption from a 
non-issue into a global concern at all levels of decision-making. Linking all three developments is 
the birth of a new anticorruption actor in May 1993: Transparency International (TI), a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) based in Berlin whose mission was recently redefined as ‘to 
work to create change towards a world free of corruption’. Although the global anticorruption 
movement is wider than TI, this NGO has gained the reputation of the most prominent civil society 
“corruption fighter” at the global level. Despite frequent references to its local constituencies and 
bottom-up approach to internal governance, TI is not a typical grass-root NGO. It was founded by 
a group of high profile people, “grey suits”, from international organisations. In less than a decade, 
TI has moved from being a tiny “briefcase” NGO to become a franchised and complex 
organisation: it comprises approximately 90 National Chapters of a variable size and nature. TI 
had to look downwards in search of national constituencies where most of the anticorruption 
instruments it battled for at the international level need to be ratified, implemented and evaluated. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the process of franchising of Transparency International, 
the implications it had upon its internal governance and the variations that can be found across its 
constituent parts, the National Chapters. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The post-Cold War political map displays three major developments, which deserve 
close attention: the global expansion of democracy;1 the growth and changing nature 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs);2  and the evolution of corruption and 
anticorruption from a non-issue into a global concern at all levels of decision-making. 
 
Linking all these three developments is the birth of a new anticorruption actor 
Transparency International (TI), an international non-governmental organisation 
(INGO) based in Berlin whose primary mission was recently defined as ‘to work to 
create change towards a world free of corruption’. 
 
Although the global anticorruption movement is wider than TI, this INGO has gained 
an indisputable recognition and reputation as the most prominent “corruption fighter” 
at the global level. This was due to various reasons: 1) it was the first to get hold of a 
transnational briefcase issue which had only been sporadically and vaguely addressed 
by other NGOs;3 2) since its early days, it has sought a coalition building strategy 
with government and public sector, private sector and civil society to promote and 
achieve its objectives which gave the organisation considerable political leverage; 3) 
it has played an active role in pressing for the adoption of two international 
conventions against corruption (OECD and UN) and, through some of its National 
Chapters (NCs), has equally led to the creation of civil society monitoring 
mechanisms on various areas of concern and encouraged them to press for the 
adoption or review of certain national legal frameworks; 4) it displays a wide 
international representation through its franchising into national constituents, the NCs, 
encompassing a variable mixture of local arrangements. In short, TI has played a 
major role in bringing corruption and anti-corruption into the agenda of IGOs and 
national governments. 
 
However, TI is far from being a typical grass-root NGO or movement, despite 
frequent references to its local constituencies and bottom-up approach to internal 
governance from some of its senior leaders and secretariat members. It was founded 
in May 19934 by a group of high profile people, “grey suits”, such as former World 
Bank executives, aid and development officials, chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
senior political leaders, with the ultimate goal of promoting transparency and curbing 
corruption in international business transactions. 
 
TI has moved from being a tiny “briefcase” INGO to become a franchised 
organisation in less than a decade. TI has enlarged – it comprises approximately 90 
NCs of a variable size and nature – and it has deepened its mission – it is no longer 
concerned solely with bribery of foreign officials and corruption in international 
business transactions, but corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
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gain”, thus taking on issues such as political corruption and corporate crime at the 
national regional and global levels. 
 
Being born in the age of globalisation, TI’s modus operandi highlights one of the 
particularities of the current international anticorruption movement: it marries a 
global and a local dimension of anticorruption activity. The fight against corruption is 
no longer contingent to State jurisdictions, actors and measures. International control 
initiatives are cumulative to those taken at the domestic level. The globalisation of 
corruption mechanisms and transactions raises the need for an externalisation and 
internationalisation of control initiatives, whilst international initiatives need to be 
transposed into national jurisdictions where most anti-corruption work is carried out. 
Whilst traditional anticorruption national actors look outwards to international fora 
and higher levels of decision-making to compensate for the insufficiency of domestic 
instruments and responses in addressing cross-border mechanisms and occurrences of 
corruption; TI, similarly to other international initiatives, had to look downwards in 
search of national partners and constituencies where most of these instruments need to 
be ratified, implemented and, hopefully, evaluated. This inevitable leads to another 
peculiarity of TI: despite its apparent cohesive outlook, the degree of consensus over 
the policy salience of corruption is not always harmonious across all NCs and does 
not reach all forms or types of occurrences with the same degree of concern. In other 
words, NCs have different concerns in spite of a global agenda against corruption to 
which they are required to adhere as constituents. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the process of franchising of Transparency 
International as an organization and the variations that can be found across its 
constituent parts: the NCs. The remaining of the paper is divided into six parts: the 
first introduces the reader to the research material used and methodology. The second 
deals with the formation of NCs and TI’s evolution, from being a small anticorruption 
network into an oft-claimed “global movement”; the third part tries to explore the 
variable nature of NCs, their structure, functioning and funding; the fourth looks at 
the quality of NCs, their actions, programmes and strategies of engagement (type and 
impact), with a special attention to the role research plays in their daily activities and 
how innovative they are in developing own methodologies and tools; the fifth part 
tries to locate NCs within TI’s organisational structure (intra-organisational 
cooperation and coordination); and, finally, some concluding remarks about TI’s 
franchising process are presented. 
 
 
 
2. A brief summary on the primary sources and research material used 
 
The research material used in this paper involves both interviews with representatives 
of NCs and the examination of their websites and other relevant documentation. 
 
Interviews were open-ended and focused on regional and national differences in 
conceptualising corruption; the structure and functioning of the National Chapter; its 
actions, strategies and programmes; the role of research in the organisation’s activities, 
funding issues and the relationship with partners. 
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Most interviews were made during TI’s Annual Membership Meeting (AMM) in 
Nairobi, 6-12 October 2004. NCs across different regions were contacted beforehand 
by e-mail via contact addresses displayed in TI’s website. Questionnaires were sent 
out only to the more senior NC officers (Chairman, Executive Directors, Project 
Directors/Coordinators). Those who were unable to attend the AMM were given the 
choice to reply by e-mail. Two NC executive directors (Brazil and Ireland) opted this 
way. The rate of reply matched satisfactorily our expectations: we initially aimed at 
three to five NCs, but at the end we were able to cover 12 (more than 10% of the total 
number of NCs). Eight interviews were made during the AMM, two were previously 
done on TI PNG and TI Thailand and two by e-mail from Brazil and Ireland. We 
ensured a broad geographical spread to reflect different cultural, political and 
intellectual traditions of thinking about corruption: two cases from the middle-East 
(TI Lebanon and TI Palestine); three from Europe (TI UK, TI Ireland and TI 
Switzerland); two from Africa (TI Tanzania and TI South Africa); one from Latin 
America (TI Brazil); two from the Pacific (TI Australia and TI PNG); one from Asia 
(TI Thailand); and one from North America (TI Canada). 
 
We also did some interviews with staff members from the Secretariat in Berlin (TI-S), 
focusing on the relationship between TI-S and NCs or regional groups. Besides, 
several informal conversations were held with other NC representatives, ex-TI 
members and academics during the past two years. 
 
As stated in the Consent Form distributed amongst and agreed by the interviewees 
beforehand, the ‘Information and opinions gathered in interviews will not be 
attributed to named individuals, or quoted, without their explicit permission, and after 
checking the precise words attributed. However the researchers may attribute 
information and opinions to generic categories of interviewees, for example “TI 
official” “TI member” “TI Australia member” “Government official – Australia” and 
so on’. 
 
 
 
3. How it all started: from a German Verein into a global movement 
 
The process of franchising of TI has two major temporal dimensions. At an early 
stage, TI has sought to expand fast into a global movement. The centrifugal drive for 
franchising and membership is part of TI’s institutionalisation process and it was 
dictated both by the need to search for a constituency (legitimisation and 
representation factors) and the need to consolidate the “brand” (marketing factor). At 
a later stage, however, once the organisation became relatively solid (in terms of its 
membership, structure, governance and funding) and its brand became well known 
world wide (Diagram 1) – due to the impact of a key number of instruments, such as 
CPI and passing of OECD convention, upon public opinion – the drive for franchising 
and membership became inevitable centripetal. Some NGOs are more successful than 
others in passing from one stage to another and some will never consider to becoming 
successful poles for attracting further members, as they do not ambition to develop 
into an institutionalised global movement of this sort. 
 
Most initial NCs started from informal contacts developed by the two TI founding 
fathers, Peter Eigen and Jeremy Pope, drawing from their previous careers as World 
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Bank official and Commonwealth Secretariat respectively. The recruitment of Jeremy 
Pope as TI’s founding Managing Director on 1 January 1994 was particularly crucial 
to this organisational development. Right from the start, he boosted for the creation of 
NCs, something that would give him considerable leverage within the organisation 
and respect amongst NCs: if TI was to operate as a global NGO it had to enlarge its 
membership and franchising its organisation, since most anticorruption work had to 
be carried out at the national level.5 The transposition of international anti-bribery 
conventions or the simple translation of TI’s Source Book into various languages as a 
mobilisation tool highlighted the need for a constituency. Pope’s National Integrity 
System (NIS) project was equally evidence of his view that after successfully 
mobilising global concern towards corruption, TI had to search for a constituency 
where to carry out its anticorruption work. 
 
It is difficult to establish a time-scale for the process of membership enlargement and 
franchising, but it can be tentatively divided into four phases (Table 1): 
 
• the brief foundation period from 1993 to 1994, during which TI formally 
accredited an initial network of five NCs – Denmark, Ecuador, Germany, the 
UK and the US. TI’s goals and activities were yet too narrow and there was no 
clear idea of where the organisation would be heading to; 
• the post 1994 Annual General Meeting (AGM) period, which lasts until 1999, 
when TI was expanding rapidly and the “movement” was gradually 
institutionalising and scoring highly mediatised initiatives (such as the 
launching of CPI in 1995 and the entry into force of the OECD Convention in 
1999); 
• from 1999 to 2003, TI was at its peak: it displayed a consolidated organisation 
and a reputable “brand” in the domain of anticorruption. Following the 
October 2002 Casablanca Meeting, TI redefined its mission and introduced 
new accreditation rules to membership to control the scope and quality of the 
franchising process; 
• and the post 2003 strategic plan, when TI’s future (from a financial and 
functional point of view) looks uncertain, its capacity to deliver innovative and 
highly mediatised products has been less striking (thus wearing out some of 
the flashisness of the brand) and the internal governance problems and power 
contests between the constituents at the bottom (NCs) and the network core or 
Establishment (Permanent Active Members, known as PAMs and the Board) 
at the top have started to mount. 
 
 
According to TI’s official version,6 at the beginning, only 15 NCs were envisaged, a 
cautious incremental approach to enlargement, given that such process would raise 
both short-term legal considerations (a new legal figure had to be found for NC 
representatives under the German Law of Associations) and future internal 
governance challenges. Incrementalism would remain wishful thinking. TI rushed into 
franchising: catch-all enfranchised membership preceded the organisation’s 
consolidation and above all of what it had to offer in terms of initiatives against 
corruption (i.e. the deepening of its mission and objectives). 
 
The first round of NCs included developing and OECD countries, transition and 
consolidated democracies, with a fair geographical spread: Kenya, Bangladesh, US, 
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UK, Germany and Ecuador (where the Ecuadorian Vice President Alberto Dahik was 
serving as the first Chair of TI’s Advisory Council). Being the founding constituents 
would prove important to these NCs within TI’s internal governance structure and 
process in years to come. 
 
In spite of the apparent multicoloured initial franchising and its juridical existence 
under the German Law of Associations, 7  early TI was essentially a Western 
organisation and mainly of Anglo-Saxon origin, a situation which has remained 
unaltered until the present: out of the ten initial Charter signatory members only one 
was from the developing world (Bangladesh); the first nine Board members had 
equally a Western majority, even if it was more balanced (5 members from developed 
countries against 4 from developing countries); and out of the 24 initial Advisory 
Council members, 14 were from the Western developed world, out of which half were 
Anglo-Saxon. 
 
Table 1. The formation of TI NCs: waves of franchising and membership status8 
Existence as 
local NGO 
prior to TI 
 1st wave 
1993-1994 
(the foundation 
phase) 
2nd wave 
1994-1999 
(the 
institutionalisation 
phase) 
3rd wave 
1999-2003 
(the 
consolidated 
phase) 
4th wave 
2003 to 
present 
(the 
redefinition 
phase) 
Argentina 
(1989), 
Ecuador (1990), 
Estonia (1991), 
Senegal 
(1993) 
 Argentina (NC), 
Bangladesh (NC), Ecuador 
(NC), Germany (NC), 
Kenya (NC), UK (NC), 
USA (NC) 
Australia (NC), Bulgaria 
(NC), Canada (NC), Chile 
(NC), Colombia (NC), 
Costa Rica (CH-IF), Czech 
Republic (NC), Denmark 
(NC), France (NC), Greece 
(NC), Guatemala (CH-IF), 
Hungary (NC), Israel 
(NC); Italy (NC), Lebanon 
(NC), Nepal (NC), 
Nicaragua (Nat’l Ct), 
Panama (NC), Paraguay 
(NC), Philippines (NC), 
PNG (NC), Slovakia (NC), 
South Africa (NC), 
Switzerland (NC), 
Thailand (NC), Turkey 
(NC), Uruguay (NC) 
Algeria (Nat’l Ct), 
Armenia (NC), 
Azerbaijan (NC), 
Bolivia (Ally), 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (NC), 
Brazil (NC), 
Cambodia (CH-IF); 
Croatia (CH-IF), 
Korea (NC), 
Lebanon (NC); 
Lithuania (NC), 
Mexico (NC), 
Moldova (NC), 
Pakistan (NC), 
Palestine Authority 
(CH-IF), Peru 
(NC), Romania 
(NC), Senegal 
(NC), Serbia (NC), 
Trinidad & Tobago 
(NC), Venezuela 
(Nat’l Ct)9 
El Salvador 
(Ally), Honduras 
(Ally), Ireland 
(CH-IF), 
Palestine (NC) 
Source: Andrea Figari (TI-S staff) and NCs websites. Membership status abbreviations: National 
Chapter (NC), Chapter in Formation (CH-IF), National Contact (Nat’l Ct) and Ally. 
 
 
One membership trump for TI was the adhesion of Poder Ciudadano in 1994, a 
prestigious Argentinean human rights and democratisation NGO created in 1989. The 
reputation of Poder Ciudadano and its well-established networks with other Latin 
American civil society organisations (CSOs) and national contacts paved TI’s 
expansion in the region. By 2000, all major LAC countries were covered with Mexico 
joining in 1999 and Brazil some months later. 
 
In 2003, TI puts in place an accreditation process to control a process that was no 
longer controllable. As part of its attempt to reinstate the earlier incremental approach, 
TI insists on a key number of normative and organisational requisites which future 
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members must adhere to (membership acquis10) and designed different status for local 
constituents in relation to the organisation: National Chapter (full member); Chapter 
in Formation (in view of short-term full membership); National Contact (regular 
contact without membership); and Ally (informal contact). Although these different 
status may imply a kind of evolutionary path to full membership, not all NCs have 
followed such evolutionary path: some Chapters in Formation have now applied for 
NC status (such as the case with TI-Costa Rica and Acción Ciudadana in Guatemala); 
others would opt to remain local anticorruption NGOs allied to TI’s mission (e.g. the 
Algerian National Contact11) or cooperating with TI or some of its NCs from time to 
time (e.g. the case of Bolivia12 and El Salvador13). 
 
During the 2004 Nairobi Annual Membership Meeting, 14  TI’s global network 
included: 72 accredited NCs; two new accredited NCs (Peru and Norway, which had 
just been object of a big scandal relating to one of its major donors and founding 
member, Statoil15); three NCs in formation (Haiti, Mongolia and Sweden); three 
National contacts (Austria, Togo and China); and, even if not mentioned during the 
introductory speech of Peter Eigen, there was also a new contact point from Ireland, 
which is currently a chapter in formation. 
 
The process of enlarging membership to NCs raised three major implications, which I 
will address next: financial, governance/organisational and legal/statutory. 
 
 
 
3.1. Adjusting to a changing international donor panorama 
 
The move towards franchising (and the adoption of a suitable label of “movement”) 
was equally a response to the changing donors’ agenda. If during the 1970s and 1980s, 
collaboration between world financial institutions, development agencies and NGOs 
was mainly directed to INGOs, often headquartered in developed countries and carry 
out operations in more than one developing country, in recent years, however, this 
trend has been reversed. With globalisation comes localism. Most projects involving 
NGO collaborations funded by these entities along with corporate and third sector 
donations were now geared towards local, community-based organisations (CBOs), in 
other words, grass-root or people’s organisations. According to World Bank figures, 
in 1994, when TI started to consider its franchising at the AGM in Quito, Ecuador, 
among projects involving NGO collaboration recorded in the Financial Year Report 
1994, 40% involved CBOs, 70% involved traditional national NGOs and 10% 
involved INGOs. These entities are substantially different from what TI was/is: they 
are individual membership organisations, voluntary with a flexible organisation. They 
tend to be the recipient of project goods and services rather than the delivers, 
designers or implementers of those projects. TI was not a grass-root organisation and 
had to search for some sort of constituency to respond to this changing financial 
panorama. It would still be able to carry on its mobility and advocacy work as tiny TI 
“ginger club”, but in order to frame large-scale project candidatures it needed to 
constitute local branches. How successful TI has been in adapting to this reality is yet 
to be seen. 
 
The putting in place of confederate or consortium16 style of organisation, through the 
creation of NCs, was not purely driven by the need to boost participation from below, 
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to increase critical mass and knowledge about local problems and possible solutions 
or to broaden its territorial representation. There are also important financial 
implications for both sides of the fence. For TI, franchising can mean a justification 
for applying to large-scale funding and attracting donors, but it can also mean a 
burden in the sense that stresses and demands will increase as some NCs start looking 
at TI as an “headquarter” with redistributive and funding obligations towards its 
branches or even question its costly and resource draining existence. Whereas for 
those joining the movement from below, there is a clear financial strategy upon which 
rests their survival and/or activity: 1) local NGOs who work or start to work on the 
field in view of future TI membership, but are unable to guarantee self-sustainability, 
the tendency is to become franchised into the global movement, because they lack 
financial resources to implement their actions alone and TI can provide a safety net 
either through their donor networks or because they are an heavy-weight mechanism 
to obtain the necessary funds from international governmental organisations (IGOs), 
national governments and even other civil society organizations; 2) those local NGOs 
that are well implanted (some of which older than the INGO itself, such as the 
Argentinean17 and Ecuadorian18 Chapters) and have solid and sustainable funding, 
negotiate their membership – joining the brand without loosing the autonomy or even, 
as with the Algerian case, remaining as an associate organisation – as a sound strategy 
to ensure stability in the international resources and foreign donations and to gain 
more visibility and weight close to internal financial and donor institutions. 
 
 
 
3.2. The organisational challenge from below 
 
The strategic decision to franchise encountered yet another problem. It was not 
sufficient for TI to label itself a movement and look as a grass-root organisation to 
appease donor institutions; it had to act as one. Once enlarged membership and 
franchising were set on track, there was little TI-S could do to stop increasing 
demands from below for greater internal transparency, accountability and 
democratisation. This organisational change, which would roll the organisation into a 
new being and raise considerable internal governance questions between TI-S and the 
NCs, became evident right from the outset during its first Annual General Meeting in 
Quito, Ecuador in 1994. At the meeting, a young Ecuadorian lawyer Valéria Merino 
Dirani19  would epitomise this evolution when, after hearing the Ecuadorian Vice 
President (and first Chair of TI’s advisory council) Alberto Dahik contested him on 
the nature and composition of the Ecuadorian Chapter: 
 
‘When he [Dahik] listed the members, recalls Pope, she responded: “That’s not a National 
Chapter, that’s a collection of your friends! That’s not Ecuadorian civil society.” In response, 
the Ecuador chapter was disbanded and pledges made to reconstitute it with wider 
representation’ (Lundberg 2002, 8). 
 
Diriani’s intervention was even more far reaching. Her protest against the nepotistic 
and closed membership of TI Ecuador – in line with the social composition trend of 
other Ecuadorian civil society entities, such as political parties – had alerted about the 
dangers of having politicians closely involved in the organisation or its NCs, 
something that TI would bitterly learn following a series of unfortunate events 
involving Mr Dahik.20 Moreover, she also made clear during that meeting that TI 
would lack credibility and capacity to deliver, if it confined itself to corruption in 
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international business transaction and disregarded the real corruption faced by 
ordinary citizens at the national level.21 
 
 
 
3.3. The legal/statutory conundrum 
 
TI’s resolution to franchise raised an immediate problem: TI was registered and 
incorporated as a eingetragener Verein (a not-for profit non-governmental 
organization with tax exemption status) under the German law of associations. The 
law requires at least seven voting members (active members) and a few other 
statutory bodies in place to constitute a Verein. NCs were an entity which was not 
foreseen under the German law of associations, hence not easily adjusted in legal 
terms. 
 
At first TI founders thought the organisation could go along in having NCs without 
voting rights (although some chairmen were enfranchised as PAMs with votes or 
members of the Advisory Council). The founding fathers had rushed into things 
without knowing exactly the future consequences of their decisions: if there was an 
initial though that TI would have to franchise in the future, one would be led to 
believe that some consideration on the adequateness of national laws/regulation of 
associations had to be given a priori. Instead, the incorporation of TI as a Verein 
under German law was an inadvertent decision. The membership of NCs became a 
legal/statutory conundrum. 
 
The inclusion of NCs in the internal governance of TI was not impossible, but it 
raised an important legal/governance problem: ‘under German law, it was nearly 
impossible to get rid of a Verein member’ (Lundberg 2002, 7). After considerable 
legal advice, NCs were granted conditional membership, which would allow the 
Chairperson to be a permanent member of TI with voting rights, despite that the 
person holding that position might change according to the internal statutes of the NC 
in question (and the national regulations in which they are constituted as legal 
entities). A compromise between German law and the different national regulations 
and between TI and NCs was finally reached. The legal mechanism for franchising 
was now in place22 and TI’s institutionalisation would assume a whole new meaning. 
The NCs would become the most important feature of TI’s organisational structure 
and functioning to the extent that they are perceived as ‘the “owners” of the TI 
movement’ (TI Sourcebook 2000, Ch. 15). 
 
The resolution to extend membership to NCs was not simply a complex juridical 
puzzle with regard to entry, but also to exit. Becoming part of an association, 
movement or party, which imposes upon its members both organisational and, above, 
all normative membership conditions (e.g. adhesion to organisation’s acquis, goals 
and mission) is often an easier process than exit. 
 
NCs can voluntarily exit from TI, but what price would they pay if they wished to 
remain in the anticorruption business? The advantages of being part of such wide 
network would probably be hampered: communication, exchange of ideas, transfer of 
knowledge, increased credibility of domestic claims and development of fundraising 
capacities (given that TI is now a consolidated brand in the “industry” of 
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anticorruption). Then again, NCs might feel that the non-concretisation of these 
advantages is the reason for departure. 
 
A different and more complex situation is that relating to disaccreditation or forced 
exit by misconduct, lack of loyalty to the organisation or violation of the aquis of 
membership. 
 
During the Nairobi 2004 AMM, Ms Ospina from TI-Colombia and head of the 
Accreditation Committee was praised by the Chairman for having put in place an 
effective system of accreditation. However, the speaker did not clarify what 
“effectiveness” meant in practical terms nor why should accreditation take place in 
the first place, since TI portraits itself as an open movement. This leads us to three 
interrelated problems: 1) What is the purpose of formal, committee-supervised 
accreditation? Or, in other words, is it an instrument of the Board to control 
enlargement of membership?; 2) Can effectiveness be raised without having 
experienced the reverse side of accreditation, which is also an integrant part of this 
process, i.e. disaccreditation or forced exit?; 3) What are the major reasons for 
disaccreditation? 
 
Disaccreditation has important legal implications for TI. NCs only become juridical 
entities within TI, if and when the verein status has been granted to their Chairpersons. 
Before that takes place NCs are only local NGOs without legal claims within TI, 
hence the organisation can simply disassociate itself publicly from that entity. 
However, since the brand is not a registered trademark, there are no serious legal 
implications for “phoney” NCs. TI can only express publicly its dissent and hope that 
they will give up identifying themselves as members of TI and refrain using its logo 
unduly. Whether “phoney” NCs will comply with such non-enforceable demand is 
another matter: 
 
‘In Ghana, for example, a teacher in a countryside village had heard about TI on a radio 
broadcast by Deutsche Welle. Inspired, he declared himself and a group of friends TI-Ghana. 
Officials in Berlin had to inform him regretfully that chapters had to be accredited and there 
could be only one per country’ (Lundberg 2002, 17). 
 
It is the Chairmanship of NCs – regardless of who occupies that position – and not 
NCs as such that are legally covered by the German law on non-profit associations. TI 
cannot get rid of a Verein that easily. If the source of tension between TI and the NC 
is the individual occupying the Chair position TI can only, at its best, invite other NC 
members to overthrow the leader according to their Chapter statutes. If the problem is 
not personal, but a hostile NC which TI would like to purge, there is a legal safeguard 
in place. In order to an NC to acquire juridical status within TI, the NC Chairman 
candidate to Verein membership has to sign a declaration before approval by the 
Board in which, he/she requests that his/her name ‘be deleted from the list of Active 
Members of Transparency International e.V. if the affiliation of (official name of the 
national chapter) should at any time be terminated by Transparency International 
e.V.’. 
 
In any case, the decision to terminate conditional membership can always be 
contested internally and in a German court of law. The likelihood of legal disputes 
that may arise with the termination of NC Chairman as a verein should not be over 
emphasised. After all, what would be the interest of a contesting active member to 
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remain in an organisation that no longer welcomes him/her? There are no monetary 
benefits involved or status to retain or worth to be battled for in a court of law. 
 
The accreditation system and committee 23  put in place is not so much about 
minimising legal ordeals that can arise from granting active membership status, but 
about controlling enlargement of membership which has institutional and power 
implications for TI’s internal governance. It is more a tentative membership screening 
mechanism of future members than a continuous process of quality certification. 
 
In legal terms, exit can only relate to individuals – PAMs, TI-S contract staff and 
Chairmen of NCs – in practice, however, the whole process of accreditation put in 
place is primarily meant to control the growth of NCs within TI, to control 
enlargement, instead of protecting the credibility of the organisation, ensuring the 
quality of national partners and keeping the organisational structure workable as often 
invoked. If TI is to be considered “a movement”, no conditionality other than 
allegiance to a basic set of principles and lines of action should be put in place. 
Ensuring the quality of NCs as a preventive measure to save the movement’s 
reputation is just another managerial jargon, which has no real meaning and 
application. In other words, disaccreditation as a means to ensure the quality and 
credibility of national partners has never been an issue and it will never be. Not only 
would such process be interpreted as an assault into the autonomy of NCs (and for 
pre-existing large chapters, this would be completely unthinkable), it could also lead 
to legal actions against TI and bring some bad publicity to the organisation. Moreover, 
judging by some existing NCs, quality and excellence has never been a criterion of 
membership. 
 
How can TI make a long-term quality certification? The organisation has already a 
poor record with individual cases in TI-S, the most recent being that of one of its 
founding fathers Jeremy Pope,24 but it has no experience with collective ones. It has 
been whispered in the corridors that, for instance, the Jordanian NC in formation 
might be at risk. What would be the disaccreditating criteria for NCs? It cannot be 
their bad performance or inefficiency. TI’s accreditation of NCs has never been and 
will never respond to market criteria: an effective NC today can become ineffective or 
comparatively less effective tomorrow. The NCs “unfaithfulness” to TI’s mission and 
operating principles could also constitute another criterion for disaccreditation, but it 
would even be a more fragile and fluid ground to work out forced exit. TI’s 
disaccreditation is likely to move towards integrity issues or violations of the code of 
conduct which put at risk the image and credibility of the organisation, such as: the 
financing practices of NCs (undisclosed sources and amounts, dubious relations with 
improper donors) or blatant cases of misconduct by their leaders. Just how viable 
would such ethics enforcement be? Since its formation, TI has undergone several 
instances of dubious conduct by NC leaders, staff and Board members, and has never 
been able to put in place a preventive framework to curtail the likelihood of future 
wrongdoing. How can it possibly ensure normative or ethics certification? The good 
NC of today can become the bad NC of tomorrow and the good PAM of today can 
become the bad PAM of tomorrow.25 
 
Whatever the criteria that might be used, it would breakdown any solidarity or 
collegiality achieved during the past ten years and would deteriorate the relationship 
between the Board and the Membership Meeting (assembly of NCs). This is why 
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discussions about the internal governance of NCs have been avoided during the 
AGMs. Once or if the process of disaccreditation is activated, it will only intensify the 
already evident power struggle between the two contending bodies within TI’s 
internal system of governance: on the one side, the growing number of NCs which are 
trying to gain status and leverage within the organisation, on the other, the 
Establishment (i.e. Board and PAMs), which is trying to hold on to power amidst the 
profound transformations in the organisation’s composition.  
 
In short, TI has not thought well in advance about how balances could be retained in 
an enlarged and enfranchised organisation and does not seem to have a long-term 
membership strategy,26 except that of copying the UN or IGO-based membership of 
national units. 
 
 
 
4. Nature of NCs 
 
As early as 1993, NCs started being formed. NCs are very different in nature and 
quality, something that is not intrinsic to TI’s franchising process but equally common 
to other INGOs. 
 
Some NCs preceded TI as well-established local NGOs of high public standing and 
‘have amended their constitutions to adopt the TI approaches and then become their 
country’s national chapter’ (TI Sourcebook 2000, Ch. 15 on Civil Society). These 
enjoy a greater degree of respect and autonomy within TI. Those created during the 
foundation years, such as TI-UK, TI-USA or TI-Kenya are the bastions of TI, so-to-
speak. They are the most pro-Board, pro TI-S and pro-leader. However, longevity in 
the organisation is not the only way to ensure strong loyalty to the international 
organisational bodies of TI and its “leadership”: NCs whose existence is strictly 
linked to TI membership and who lack financial sustainability are equally faithful 
supporters. One special case was the creation of TI-Germany, founded by TI 
Establishment people as a means to overcome the problem of identifying TI 
movement as Germany’s chapter. Some NCs were created by design others by default 
(Lundberg 2002, 17). Some have overcome the initial dependence on the ideas, 
interests and vision of its founders and have become institutionalised; others remain a 
few-men band. Some are financial autonomous; others are unable to guarantee their 
subsistence without a little help from its big brother TI. Some have clear agendas in 
response to specific needs and problems in their own country; others have simply 
adjusted TI global priorities to their own settings with little applicability or impact. 
 
Two elements contributed to this multi-faceted constellation of NCs: 1) the national 
laws of associations and taxation (which in a way prescribe or force NCs to assume a 
particular model of organisation); and 2) Berlin’s initial incapacity, and later 
resolution, to define a model of how a NC should look like. If in the early days of TI, 
hardly any of the founding fathers, including Eigen himself, had a clear idea of what 
an NGO looked like or had had any experience in civil society; at a later stage, they 
avoided setting models as evidenced in the Guidelines for the Formation of National 
Chapters: ‘There are no hard and fast rules about the structure or status of a non- 
governmental organisation in a country which wishes to work in support of TI's 
objectives’.27 There is a pragmatic justification for doing so: the juridical and cultural 
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diversity of the countries concerned and the unwillingness to interfere/intervene in 
what should be a civil society initiative. 
 
TI claims that one of its top priorities is to build capacity to deliver at the grass-roots 
level, where most problems are felt and action is needed, without forgetting 
membership to a global network with an overarching mission. In order to achieve so, 
it seeks to engage ‘groups that are expressly non-partisan and non-confrontational. 
Consultations draw in other relevant segments of civil society – typically business 
leaders, journalists, religious figures, academics, existing NGOs with shared aims, 
members of chambers of commerce and other professional bodies – to test the 
interests and feasibility of forming a national chapter’ (TI Sourcebook 2000, Ch. 15 
on Civil Society). In short, TI labels itself a grass-root movement thanks to the 
formation of local NCs, run by local individuals and aimed at local concerns. 
 
However, TI was not fully coherent in its grass-root approach. It suffices to read the 
TI Guidelines for the formation of National Chapters a few lines ahead to have an 
idea of its understanding of civil society: under the grass-root façade – ‘Each national 
chapter is indigenous and wholly locally owned’ and ‘will form a part of a network of 
mutually supportive organisations throughout the world’ – lies a more centralised, 
organic and instrumental reality. The movement is defined organically: ‘The TI 
movement comprises the TI international organs’. It is not about ideas and peoples, 
but organs and, goes without saying, rules and power. Moreover, ‘Whenever TI is 
invited by a government to develop a programme in its country, a national chapter 
will be organised’. In a few words, TI has an interventionist and instrumentalist view 
of how civil society should get organised: the “government wishes, TI provides” 
approach to the formation of NCs raises serious doubts as to the grass-root nature and 
political impartiality/neutrality of some of these entities. 
 
 
 
4.1. What grass-root links? 
 
Before assessing whether NCs actually fit the grass-root label, it is useful to look at 
the concept itself. What does grass-root mean? 
 
The term grass-root is inspired in the German word "Keimform" (kernel) and it 
expresses a movement organized by a local network of citizens engaged in action (i.e. 
activist) to create social, political or any other change. Grass-root CSOs are often 
characterised by the following elements: 1) local civil society creation (indigenous); 
2) voluntary and spontaneous civil society creation (no interventionism); 3) 
everybody’s  (open membership: anyone is entitled to become an activist and leader 
of the organisation; level of education, money or political status do not grant a 
privileged access and rank within the organisation); 4) representation of local 
concerns; 5) non-confrontational action; 6) rejection of hierarchical and ideological 
organisation structures (self-governed; control from within). 
 
Formally, all NCs are local organisations in so far they are registered and develop 
their activities in their own countries. In practice, however, a good deal of them are 
not voluntary and spontaneous civil society creations. Various NCs have been put in 
place thanks to the contact efforts made by prominent TI-S figures. These start as 
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strategic contacts with local personalities and then evolve into NCs under TI’s 
auspices and, in some cases, with the blessing of the “host” government. 
 
Formally, all NCs are constituted and run by local individuals, but only a few provide 
an open membership formula through which individuals can join the organisation, 
voice their problems and participate, actively or passively, in the democratic selection 
of their leaders.28 Since TI’s statutes do not provide for individual membership (with 
the rare exception of the undemocratically group of personalities with voting capacity, 
i.e. PAMs), local problems and concerns can only be voiced through NC 
representatives during the AGMs. For TI, individual membership and NCs’ 
governance is secondary to the creation of national branches and this is as “local” as 
TI can get. The lack of representation of local concerns and accountability within NCs, 
questions the grass-root nature of TI as a whole. TI has grown considerably over the 
past ten years, but it has not necessarily become grass-root as claimed: it looks more 
like an IGO with different decentralised national units, than a global movement made 
of local constituencies.  
 
The definition of grass-root also presumes a certain level of democratisation of the 
constitutive social base. It is meant to express empowered “common people” and 
“mass membership” and not simply an organisation of a few enlightened, well-
educated, rich or politically attached elites, which currently characterises TI. However, 
this remains a utopian view of what organised civil society is about. Most NGOs are 
bourgeois creations, oligarchic and elitist (even though the same could be argued to 
other civil society entities, such as political parties). It is an unavoidable feature of 
organised civil society common to other NGOs. 
 
Similar to TI-S, NCs are predominantly elitist, a collection of “grey suits” 
personalities: 
 
‘As a rule, TI Chapters comprised the elite – academics, politicians, lawyers, doctors, and 
journalists. In Belgium, the TI Chapter chairman was Baron Jean Godeaux, former president 
of the central bank. In Malawi, Anglican Bishop the Right Reverend Bvumbwe headed the 
chapter. […] TI was an organisation of “insiders” more likely to promote top-down change 
than bottom-up street protest’ (Lundberg 2002, 17). 
 
This takes us back Diriani’s argument during the 1994 AGM in Quito: just how 
“everybody’s”, “indigenous” and “locally owned” NCs are? Most executive directors 
and chairpersons have higher education (some hold PhDs) and hold senior positions in 
companies (as CEOs), foundations (as Chairpersons) or have served (or still hold) a 
political or senior public position nationally or in an international organisation (such 
as the WB or UN). There are exceptions to the rule: the South African Chairperson, 
for example, comes closer to the common definition of “activist” as a longstanding 
trade unionist. 
 
Most NCs are small both in terms of their staff and membership. Only a small number 
of NCs have in place an open membership formula. Some allow individuals to 
become members, by paying an annual membership fee and grant them statutory 
voting rights, but have not actively sought mass membership. This is the case with 
most West European NCs, which function like small lobby groups or civic action 
clubs. By contrast, in Latin America, both the Brazilian29 and the Argentine Chapters 
closely resemble mass-movement NGOs given their large size individual membership. 
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The capacity of extended mobilisation, however, is not very different from that of 
smaller “grey suit”, elitist NCs. Taken TI Brazil as an example, in what concerns the 
sociological characterization of those individuals who show an interest in the 
Chapter’s activities, its “target audience” is essentially middle-age, highly instructed 
males from the large metropolitan cities (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). 
 
 
 
4.2. The (political) impartiality and neutrality of NCs: the dangers of 
instrumentalisation 
 
Despite that the Guidelines recommend NCs to be ‘non-partisan and non-political’, 
the predominance of the coalition-building strategy upon all other traditional forms of 
civil society engagement – such as confrontation, protest, watchdog – opens the road 
to a series of comfortable compromises and conflicts of interest which put at risk TI’s 
credibility and seriousness before public opinion. 
 
The passage of some leading figures of TI Kenya to governmental office, and the new 
government’s definition of an anticorruption strategy which targets primarily the 
outgoing incumbents and remains at the level of cosmetic measures, damages the 
credibility and independence of the NC as a civil society actor by making it look as a 
useful electoral ramp with a clearly defined political agenda. The recent resignation of 
the head of the presidential anticorruption office, John Githongo, a leading figure of 
TI-Kenya in protest to President Mwai Kibaki's alleged inertia and lack of 
commitment to fight corruption does not fully clarifies the Chapter’s involvement in 
this whole process.30 
 
The promiscuous relationship between NCs and domestic politics is also valid for 
OECD ones. The TI Italia is run by sympathisers of the populist movement Lega 
Nord, who have, on various occasions, muffled news about the current centre-right 
government coalition (of which Lega is a member), including Mr Berlusconi’s latest 
corruption scandals. 
 
In the US, the matter is not so much proximity to the government or administration, 
but to large American corporate interests. TI-USA has virtually said nothing or done 
nothing about corruption in the US or by its business corporations: it does not address 
and mobilise its population to corruption in its own country when the majority of 
global activists denounce the predator behaviour of US corporations in developing 
countries through never ending manifestations during the G8 and Free Trade summits; 
when half of the American population contest the performance of US presidential 
elections on grounds of legality, being it procedural or financial; when the mingling of 
corporate and political interests is a widely accepted feature of US regulatory politics.  
The Chapter is largely a creation of the US corporate community, hence it is not 
surprising that they believed the 1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was 
an effective anticorruption instrument and a best practice to the rest of the developed 
and the developing world. Even less surprising is TI’s passivity to the Chapter’s 
biased or short-sighted view, since the latter is crucial to the financial sustainability of 
the former. 
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4.3. The financial sustainability and independence of NCs 
 
Funding is crucial to any organisation in carrying out their activities. The capacity to 
raise the appropriate funds and to ensure the organisation’s independence vis-à-vis 
their donors/contributors, are two important dimensions of the nature of NCs. Other 
relevant issues concern the transparency and independent auditing of accounts (clear 
accounting rules, publicity and publication) and the integrity of its members in 
relation to sources and amounts of donations. 
 
NCs vary in size and sustainability of their funding. Contrary to what one might 
expect, some NCs in developing countries are often better resourced than their 
counterparts in the northern hemisphere (for instance, Western European NCs), thanks 
to funding from national and international development agencies and corporations.31 
The financial needs of NCs, is something that cannot be interpreted only in North-
South terms. 
 
As mentioned before, the formation of new NCs and TI’s fast franchising is closely 
associated to its need to adjust to a changing donor panorama. This is valid for the 
creation of series of NCs in developing parts of the world, but the need to set a local 
Chapter in order to ensure continuous support of national aid agencies to TI’s cause 
was also the case for some OECD NCs. According to the Chairperson of TI Canada, 
support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to TI was 
unlikely to continue if they had not constituted a local chapter. 
 
In some cases, TI’s direct involvement and interest in NC formation was financially 
and logistically crucial. This was particularly the case with the inclusion of a US 
Chapter from day one. The Chairman of the Board of TI-USA was a lawyer in the 
legal department of General Electric. He was a full-time TI staff, seconded by the 
company during the first years. This senior corporate lawyer was very active at 
various levels. He developed very close relationships between TI-USA and a series of 
national and international institutions: the US State Department (USAID),32 the World 
Bank, US foundations (such as the Ford Foundation, 33  which is the process of 
generating another large grant to TI), and the US business community (some of which 
world wide known for their involvement in major corruption and fraud scandals).34 
TI-USA has played an important role in attracting funding for TI, which has granted it 
considerable leverage within the organisation (to the extent that it has been whispered 
in the corridors that the next TI Chairperson might be recruited from the TI-USA 
leadership). From the standpoint of TI’s moral crusader banner, TI-USA funding 
rapports are probably more a problem than a solution.35 
 
Finding a sustainable funding strategy is not an easy task to most NCs and there is 
little help they can hope from TI-S, except managerial advice from an entity whose 
finances are less than sound. In some cases, NCs have benefited from a lump sum to 
start business, but have been unable to design a membership/fee strategy capable of 
ensuring diversity of sources and regularity of funding. TI-Canada can be singled out 
as having put in place a successful and variable membership/fee structure which 
served as an example to other NCs. The basic principle to prevent money influence 
and ensure independence from donors was that no source should provide more than 
approximately 1/3 of the total revenue of the organization: 1/3 from government 
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(public), 1/3 from business, 1/3 from individual membership and projects. It was 
extremely important to involve the business sector. However, TI-Canada had to make 
sure that they were not the voice of the business community, but only partners in a 
coalition. It has been a struggle to maintain that independence vis-à-vis the corporate 
world: business voice can be very strong. In order to ensure diversity and regularity of 
funding, they invited people to decide what degree of participation/involvement they 
wanted in the organization and from that they set up different fee categories: 1) 
charter members for 5000 Canadian dollars with a commitment of 2 years of support 
(provided stability of funding for the first two years of the organization, the fragile 
institutionalisation period); 2) professional/business members invited to contribute 
anything from 1000 to 5000 Canadian dollars; 3) government members (government 
department could joint TI-Canada) for 500 dollars; 4) and individual members for 50-
100 dollars. Further to the fee structure the Chapter also allowed for the sponsoring of 
specific activities/initiatives: for instance, CIDA had largely funded all first seminars, 
dinners, etc, which were effectively launching events. 
 
The bottom line is that most NCs are in similar financial strains as TI-S and they have 
been unable to attract regular funding. Most survive on an annual income that is less 
than the annual salary-cum-benefits of one single high official of TI-S. This creates 
considerable tension between NCs and TI-S: the raison d’être of the latter has been 
measured against its decreasing capacity to attract funding for its movement partners, 
thus questioning one of the major advantages of being part of such a network. Fixed 
costs take much of TI’s budget,36 whereas money spent in actual research is minimal 
and the ratio of money being transferred to NCs is very small (USD$6,000 per region 
with ¼ of this amount is retained by TI-S for the development of common projects). 
TI is living on the edge every year. The need to assemble an endowment fund for 
projects has again been discussed during the last AGM. How can TI be serious on 
delivering goods to NCs and investing on research if most of its budget is constituted 
by donations (which are conjunctural resources, hence unstable) and the major 
elements of expenditure are fixed running costs (rent and personnel)? Despite 
mounting financial difficulties, TI has not made a real effort to 1) recruit researchers 
with experience on the field and research managers for the finance and fundraising 
departments of TI-S who know how to apply for national and EU research funds37 and 
2) explore the potential critical mass available across chapters. 
 
Not only NCs cannot depend on TI, since in Berlin every penny earned is a penny 
spent, they often have to compete with TI-S for donors at the domestic level. This is 
particularly true with regard to national aid and development agencies. The issue was 
raised during the 2004 Nairobi AGM and it was agreed that TI-S should no longer 
approach domestic sources without prior consultation with the NCs concerned.  
 
The majority of NCs have not been able to strike a balance in sources of funding.38 A 
large number of NCs in developing countries rely on international donations, 
primarily from Western foundations and aid agencies, which account for more than 
half of their annual income. US money, whether from corporations, state agencies or 
foundations is not welcomed in some Arab countries, where there is an understanding 
that such aid has hidden political intents.39 The risk of dependence on one source of 
funding is also a fact for NCs in OECD countries: TI-UK and TI-Australia, for 
instance, have difficulties in attracting private funding and are mainly sponsored by 
aid agencies or national governments. In other cases, such imbalance is created by the 
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view that banning certain forms of funding, namely corporate donations will 
guarantee the Chapter’s independence (TI Lebanon). 
 
One area of concern, which directly relates to TI’s governance, is the lack of uniform 
or standardised accounting and financial reporting procedures across NCs. Around 70 
NCs presented audited reports in various formats. This makes it virtually impossible 
to put in place an effective system difficulty to monitoring and sanctioning of 
wrongdoing. Few NCs have put in place a clear accounting system comprehensible to 
everyone, especially donors and the public at large. The fact that NCs are registered as 
local NGOs and subject to different national accounting regimes (hence with different 
auditing standards), it is not a sufficient reason to justify the lack of basic information 
on the overall income and expenditure of NCs (sources and amounts). Even fewer 
NCs make their annual accounts and financial statements publicly available for 
consultation online. 
 
The need to strengthen internal auditing systems to prevent any wrongdoing at TI-S or 
NCs was convened again during the 2004 Nairobi AGM, showing the morally 
charged context in which TI discusses internal governance issues. TI feels uneasy to 
handle the likelihood of financial impropriety resulting from business contributions. 
For instance, if a donor corporation has bribed, should TI or any NC financed by that 
company abdicate from their money? If a company bribes in one country, does that 
mean that an NC from another country also financed by the same corporation must 
abdicate from its contribution? NC representatives have been posing these and other 
questions to TI senior officials in the context of an operating disaccreditation system, 
but have not received any clear answers. TI’s uneasiness to deal with these issues 
results from a moral high ground which has raised throughout the years and cannot 
coherently sustain. On various occasions, NCs have accepted donations from 
“corrupt” corporations (TI-Norway recently) and TI did not have an adequate 
response to this problem, because the financial dealings between TI and the corporate 
world are based on a moral paradox: whilst some NC and TI leaders are publicly in 
favour of the introduction of anticorruption instruments such as “corporate black lists” 
– thus raising the moral stakes against corporate misconduct – they are also too 
willing to build-coalitions with the business sector and open their hands to juicy 
corporate contributions. For a “corrupt” corporation or politician to join the 
movement or simply make a large donation to a local Chapter can have a similar 
significance as the art of selling indulgences by Pope León X, whereby a soul could 
be released from purgatory by paying the Church a juicy fee. TI needs money to 
accomplish work and keep in business, hence a blind eye can be given to a “corrupt” 
corporation that wants to ask for forgiveness of its sins. Many corporations look at TI 
as the grand master of all moral crusaders and hence the only body empowered to 
issue such public absolution. Being a member of TI while facing a court prosecution 
on corruption can be quite convenient. 
 
 
 
5. The Quality of NCs: Actions, programmes and strategies of engagement 
 
Although there is some variation in the areas of concern across NCs, not all have been 
able to define their priority areas by drawing on local contexts and issues of concern. 
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NCs’ agendas are often unrepresentative of the major corruption scandals and issues 
of concern in their respective countries and do not offer a holistic approach to control. 
 
Most NCs have adopted TI’s global priorities as a sign of allegiance to its 
transnational agenda, but only a few have been active in contributing to their 
implementation: 
 
• Political corruption: both TI-Brazil (Project Às Claras (www.asclaras.org.br) and 
Poder Ciudadano (TI-Argentina)) have adopted an watchdog approach to political 
financing by informing voters about political donations to candidates and 
monitoring observance with law. The Brazilian initiative, in particular, offers a 
long-term research utility by providing an on-line database on candidates to 
elections and their donors that enable statistical analyses; 
• Public Procurement: TI-Indonesia and TI-Pakistan have been active in putting in 
place new procurement programs. The degree of innovation and success of these 
instruments is relative. Some of these countries had only a few public 
procurement guidelines in place left by the colonial powers, hence reviewing and 
upgrading tendering laws and procedures was in itself an achievement. TI 
Colombia has favoured the creation of a permanent observatory by enrolling a 
variety of partner civil society institutions (academia and chambers of commerce) 
to oversee the review of the public tendering regime; 
• Private Sector: TI Lebanon surveyed a large number of firms in their dealings 
with public administration. Its major innovation has been its work on construction 
permits transactions during the post-War reconstruction. The study might offer 
some applicability to other post-war reconstruction contexts, such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq; 
• Convention: TI-Canada, in particular through his President, Professor Wes Cragg 
of the Schulich School of Business at York University, has devoted a good deal of 
research to the intricacies of setting global ethical standards to business, played an 
important pivotal role in the entry into force of the OECD Convention, by 
persuading the Canadian government to push the legislation through before the 
December 31 deadline. This pressure proved crucial, because the Convention had 
to be ratified by five major OECD countries in order to become effective. Canada 
was the last of the five to ratify, but the whole legislative process (Senate approval 
plus House of Commons three readings) only lasted one day. The understanding 
of what “advancing” or “implementing” means is quite different from one Chapter 
to another. In some cases, NCs contribution in this domain has been merely 
informative and symbolic, for instance, through the production of booklets to the 
wider public explaining what the convention is about. 
 
 
There are also a number of additional global priorities, such as, securing access to 
information, combating money-laundering, supporting recovery of illicit assets and 
creating ethics education programmes, which some NCs have started on their own 
initiative and which TI-S as picked up as “good practice” to be exported to the whole 
“movement”. 
 
It is difficult to know the level of engagement in certain activities. NC executive and 
programme directors tend to overemphasize the spread of their areas of activity and 
research commitments as well as strategies of engagement. It is difficult to 
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corroborate such information with the interviews made. The websites and activity 
reports are not credible sources of information either, since there is no peer review or 
independent evaluation of the nature, extent and impact of those initiatives. 
 
Bearing in mind these empirical shortcomings, the table that follows shows a 
comparative overview of the information obtained with the intent of highlighting 
variation on the volume and type of activities developed by NCs and their degree of 
autonomy in agenda setting. The table takes into consideration the following 
variables: longevity of NCs within the movement (waves of membership), different 
democratic cultures (old vs new democracies and OECD vs developing countries) and 
geographical/cultural spread (two per each region and western vs non-western, south 
vs south). 
 
[Insert Annex 1: Table 2 Global priorities and Domestic concerns] 
 
The NCs autonomy in setting their own agendas is largely dependent on their capacity 
to attract critical mass (for instance, through internship programmes or by establishing 
close relationships with academia) and financial resources. Unsustainable NCs tend to 
go along with TI’s global priorities, which in practical terms, means doing symbolic 
initiatives, such as: “corruption is bad” workshops, media coverage of the latest 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), signing of protocols and integrity pledges, and 
awarding public figures for their anticorruption role. 
 
The majority of NCs accept TI’s definition of corruption and have not sat down to 
discuss it in detail with their peers or with TI-S. It is simply not an issue. Most NCs 
share a domestic and international interest on corruption, though priority seems to be 
given to the former, with very few exceptions, such as TI-UK and TI-USA who have 
said very little about corruption in their own countries. There is widespread belief that 
corruption is a non-normative, developmental issue related to the State’s manifest 
allocation inefficiency, discretion and lack of accountability. A very technical, 
principal-agent-client approach to corruption, which ignores the more normative 
dimensions of the phenomenon and, therefore, puts more emphasis on legal/formal 
anticorruption mechanisms and enforcement than on the preventive approaches and 
ethics management. It is in those countries in which CSOs have played an important 
role in democratic consolidation, such as Latin American ones, that NCs have a more 
holistic approach to corruption and show greater concern about its implications to the 
democratic ethos.40 
 
In most NCs, however, there is also a low understanding of conflicting values and 
undemocratic effects of some anticorruption measures when devising, recommending 
or supporting governmental initiatives. At this level, different civic and democratic 
traditions across NCs come into play. TI Korea, for instance, had welcomed 
uncritically the government’s decision to ban mass rallies during elections, because 
these had been “infested” by corrupt practices in the past (i.e. people were allegedly 
being bribed to attend political rallies). In what degree does that measure strengthens 
the ethics infrastructure of South Korea? To what extent is it safeguarding other 
democratic values such as freedom of association, speech and rallying? Justifying the 
implementation of such draconian measure, as a necessary evil to the enforcement of 
political financing laws is a high price to pay: it jeopardizes democracy and civil 
rights. In a country with a large manufacturing industry (for instance, in the 
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automobile sector), it can easily become an excuse for an incumbent’s heavy-handed 
approach to trade union protest. But that seemed not to worry the “local activist”, who 
was more interested in the immediate symbolic gains: ticking yet another 
“achievement” in the country’s list of available anticorruption instruments. Part of the 
problem also resides on TI’s populist approach to corruption: there is too much 
emphasis on the need to curb corruption at all costs without measuring the negative 
implications of some measures to transition or consolidating democracies. In fact, TI 
offers two menus/strategies to NCs in formation adjustable to the institutional and 
political contexts of the “hosting” country: a “full menu”, in which anticorruption is 
understood as part of a greater social and political change (i.e. democracy promotion 
and consolidation) versus a light menu, in which anticorruption is simply a means to 
safe development (risk free and effective), regardless of the promotion of civic and 
democratic rights in the country concerned.  TI and NCs in some developing countries 
are more inclined towards the latter version, which avoids lengthy and unpleasant 
debates on Western dominated formats of anticorruption reform and allows for 
cultural relativism; whereas other NCs, especially those in Europe and Latin America, 
tend to prefer a more systemic and holistic approach to corruption control which 
cannot be disassociated with the performance of democratic institutions.  
 
Concern about corporate crime and political corruption are, generally speaking, 
secondary to public sector misconduct. Private sector anticorruption initiatives do not 
go much further than the adoption of international conventions and political 
corruption is something that a large number of NCs find hard to address, often due to 
the incapacity of their senior officials in keeping an arm’s length from the business 
and political sectors. These two “TI priorities” have witnessed little progress partly 
due to the coalition-building strategy recommended by TI and adopted by all NCs. In 
most cases, coalition building has not been translated into effective and independent 
partnerships as expected, but instrumental or symbolic gatherings with the political 
and business sectors. Where some results have been obtained, it has been through a 
watchdog approach and by assessing, analysing and diagnosing vulnerable or risk 
areas in the public, political and private spheres and collecting, publicising and 
supplying information to stakeholders. 
 
The strategies of engagement are largely standardised. Most NCs do not see 
themselves as a “protest and street mobilizing” but opinion-forming organizations. In 
line with TI’s position, their major strategies of engagement are about informing and 
raising awareness and, to some extent, lobbying and pressing decision-makers to 
adopt certain corruption control instruments. 
 
The coalition-building strategy is in itself evidence of TI’s lack of grass-root 
composition. Trade unions have also developed partnership strategies of negotiation 
vis-à-vis decision-makers, because (un)employment, similar to corruption, is a policy 
issue which raises an ultimate common interest between the parties involved. 
However, common interest does not mean uniform interest. It is not unusual that trade 
unions decide to abandon negotiations and return to strikes and street protest. In fact 
they have never used the word coalition-building but negotiation, they are not 
coalition partners, but social partners. A coalition presumes a strategic bond between 
the partners that regularly leads to a real or perceived compromise and amalgamation 
of positions and interests, hence a shared responsibility in the decisions or actions 
taken. Such promiscuity of roles and interests inevitably hampers the free-judgement 
 21
and independent action of NCs. Working close to governments as an NGO without 
keeping the arm’s length raises the possibility that some might use TI as a political 
ramp and makes TI co-responsible for the (lack of) success with regard to anti-
corruption policies designed and implemented.41 
 
There is little or no credible evaluation of results. Most NCs claim that there projects 
or programmes have had an impact in 1) increasing awareness of corruption; 2) in 
creating or strengthening the anticorruption structures; 3) in empowering civil society. 
Very rarely donors ask for impact assessments and when they do NCs provide proxy 
indicators of success with no independent certification.  
 
Although some NC leaders and senior TI officials argue that it is difficult to measure 
the effects of anticorruption activities (and a few others go even further questioning 
the need to evaluate) that does not preclude them from always claiming a positive 
impact. The most emblematic initiatives are often measurable, but the project design 
has never contemplated such task. We can only speculate of the reasons why. 
 
The non-evaluation of projects and programmes has two immediate consequences: 1) 
there is a matter of accountability to donors. Their decision to continue supporting the 
organisation or any of its local branches might be dependent on reporting on how the 
money was spent and with what results, unless donors feel happy with a symbolic 
approach to their investment (their anticorruption interest is often instrumental to a 
wider State-Market reform); 2) if TI or NCs do not evaluate results of their activities, 
others will. There is a growing of disaffected TI members, academics and competing 
organisations in the market of anticorruption which are just too eager to check TI’s 
claimed success by evaluating results beyond anticorruption rhetoric.42 
 
 
 
5.1. The unclear role of research 
 
Research is expected to play a major role in the daily life of NCs, since TI eschews 
NCs from engaging in investigation. 43  Moreover, given the intended preventive 
character of most of their activities, research is needed to detect areas of concern and 
recommend possible solutions. 
 
Most NCs do not carry research of their own, even if, similar to TI-S, they constantly 
insist they do. Very few operate as think tanks or research centres. Very few display a 
group of paid experts that undertake research or give advice, especially to a 
government, on policy matters. Such category would require a good level of research 
being carried out by the institution itself, which is not the case with NCs or TI-S. In 
the words of a TI-S staff person, “TI manages research more than it actually executes”. 
It is a hub of contacts. It knows where to get the information and expertise from, but 
does not develop research capabilities of its own. This model has been replicated 
down the ladder by the majority of NCs, especially those who lack regular or 
sustainable means of financing: research is expensive and to develop into a research 
unit, considerable efforts had to be devoted to funding applications and boosting 
critical mass capabilities. 
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Some NCs actually expect TI-S to help them in that domain, both by framing 
common research projects44 and searching for research funds. However, TI-S has not 
been able to deliver in either dimension. During the 2004 AMM in Nairobi, the 
MENA group questioned the current executive director, David Nussbaum why TI-S 
was “reluctant” to support the translation of the Source Book into Arabic, a EU-
funded project in almost its totality (80%) to which TI only had to secure 20% of the 
total costs. Nussbaum’s reply was that all had to do with the slow pace of the funds 
negotiated with the EU and also with the fact that TI-S in 2001 and 2002 ran on 
deficit (due to dollar devaluation, which affects a large sum of contributions, mostly 
from the US and to a decrease in contributions, due to difficult conjuncture to donors 
themselves). The project did go ahead as expected, however, the whole process 
highlighted the discrepancy between NCs rising expectations on TI’s capacity to 
deliver in securing financing for NCs’ projects and TI’s limited expertise in applying 
for EU research money. According to the Executive Director of TI Lebanon, most 
NCs in the region lack people with expertise in putting down applications for 
available funding programmes. For that reason TI-S should improve its capacity to 
apply successfully for funds that are currently available at the EU or European aid 
agencies for the Mediterranean and Middle-East region. Another example of TI’s 
limited capacity to deliver in the field of research was the failed attempt to build a 
research centre in the UK and the subsequent transfer of such intentions to Berlin, 
following the departure of the two core supporters of such strategy (Jeremy Pope and 
Fredrik Galtung). 
 
The lack of success in developing its own research capabilities has also to do with the 
relationship TI has developed with academia, which, in its turn, is related to the 
working place culture and job socialization of most of its senior members, i.e. retired 
“grey suits” from IGOs with little interest in research unless applied to the agencies’ 
political goals. Commissioned research preferably, so that costs of unpleasant findings 
are minimized – since research plays an instrumental role, there is always a certain 
degree of uncertainty that can be damaging to the agencies strategies or modus 
operandi – and quantitative foremost – since numbers can be more easily manipulated 
to mobilize people, raise issues to the public debate and lobby governments to address 
them respectively. The pattern of recruitment of IGOs, such as the World Bank or the 
UN, is replicated in TI. Senior secretariat and Board members have no time or 
patience for academic and their “bold” approaches without synthesis, clear answers 
and adequate solutions to the problem of corruption. They need to act, and fast, more 
than they need to ponder and analyse things: they are, as Peter Larmour put it, “old 
men in a hurry”. PhDs are recruited not for their successful academic careers on the 
field, but due to their working experience in the NGO world or passage through 
governmental and IGO office. This has not only deprived TI-S of experts on the field 
of corruption and anticorruption, it has also created a bureaucracy which is aware of 
its limitations and will try to defend its vested interests amidst the need for change. 
TI-S continues to sustain that it manages research only, but it also refrains from 
looking for expertise outside Berlin when needed because that would question its 
existence or at least it would put some pressure on the justification of staff costs. 
 
Despite the recurrent call for the need to attract more volunteer specialists and 
advisers, TI’s leadership has invested little time and effort to actually explore the 
amount of critical mass available across the NCs and the possibilities of framing 
common research projects and applying for research money. Such effort would 
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require a different recruitment policy by starting, for instance, with the contracting of 
an expert in framing and submitting candidatures under EU Research Framework 
Programmes and/or Europeaid programmes. A few European NCs have been 
successful in profiting from these programmes, for instance, to assist them in starting 
their activities and websites,45 but a general tone of dissatisfaction remains across 
NCs as to the overall incapacity of TI-S to deliver in this domain. 
 
Some NCs have attracted (and recruited) academics and researchers into their 
organisation and this has proved fundamental to the development of innovative 
initiatives, such as the research on arms trade and corruption developed by TI-UK, the 
monitoring of electoral fraud and corruption by TI-Brazil, and the assessment on the 
prospects of the international penal instruments put in place by the two conventions 
(OECD and UN) developed by TI-Canada. 
 
 
 
6. Intra-organisational cooperation and coordination: NCs/TI-S relations 
 
The majority of NCs, especially unsustainable ones, found it uncomfortable to raise 
criticisms about their relationship with TI-S.  Hence, when asked if TI-S plays a role 
in framing and supporting the Chapter’s activities, they often reply positively. There 
can be no disadvantages of being part of TI, since their existence is framed within and 
for TI. Even if some did make one or two remarks on the “difficulty” which TI has 
had in recent years to secure financial support to their activities, most did not speak 
freely and were very evasive in this domain. 
 
Large NCs, however, have a more critical stand. Some ignore any relationship with 
TI-S, simply because TI-S does not play a role in the Chapter’s activities nor does it 
help them in searching for funding. In the words of a NC Chairperson, “TI needs us 
more than we need TI”. According to another NC executive director, the relationship 
with TI-S is “always difficult when it comes to strategy, methodology, discussions on 
principles, institutional relations. Easier concerning bureaucratic matters, but even 
then TI-S disorganization sometimes gets in the way”. The availability of NC 
representatives to talk about various governance issues is in itself evidence of the 
mounting internal power struggle between the NCs and the Establishment (Board and 
PAMs). Fundamental disagreements with chapters are starting to be heard whilst TI is 
putting in place a formula to control enlargement and the increased power of NCs 
within the organisation. Although TI portraits itself as a “global coalition” where 
different interests and conceptions co-exist, in practice dissenting views are 
courteously suppressed and dissenters dismissed. In the words of an NC executive 
director, “Gossip is a much more relevant way of communication than rational 
convincement. TI-S is the closest thing to a Hamletian court that I ever became 
involved with”. 
 
Having said this, TI-S does not always engage in selective purges and backstage 
persecution. The organization has been quite successful in overcoming personal 
divergences and building consensus by resorting both to negotiation and interest 
accommodation and the selective redistribution of benefits (financial or status).  
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Besides ensuring the allegiance of its members to the organisation’s mission and 
objectives, TI needs also to promote a certain image of idiosyncratic cohesiveness. 
Similar to other CSO organisations devoted to great causes (e.g. Amnesty 
International and the respect for human rights), TI is faced with the need of rallying 
people towards a common goal without resorting to money influence or protection by 
force of arms as a means of motivating them and conquering their allegiance. As part 
of its implantation, institutionalisation and operation in society, TI was confronted 
with the need to create myths, traditions and rituals other than putting in place a solid 
bureaucratic organisation. As Sampson put it, ‘The world of anticorruption has its 
own events, its foundation myths and its own folklore, a kind of mirror image of 
Myrdal’s “folklore of corruption” from 35 years ago’ (Sampson 2004). This is 
gradually being achieved through a series of symbolic actions and language, which 
confer to the organisation a certain degree of religiosity: 
 
• The organisation of large events in developing countries where TI’s 
anticorruption mission and discourse finds fertile terrain. A TI annual meeting 
organised in a developing country has a far greater propagandistic impact than 
if it took place in any developed Western democracy; 
• The success of its initiatives (although not excluded) is over-inflated without a 
balanced and self-critical view. There is little or no independent assessment of 
activities. In most cases, evaluation of results accounts to no more than a 
newspaper clip or a standardised paragraph in a donors report. Most written 
materials are not peer reviewed and the views of renowned authors on the field, 
which are contrary to TI’s position, are ignored. Outside criticism is 
unwelcome; 
• Strong charismatic leadership is an added value to ensure idiosyncratic 
cohesiveness. This has largely been achieved by concentrating all public 
relations opportunities or windows of visibility in one man, Peter Eigen: one 
founder, one leader… one spokesman and spotlight man; 
• There is also an intensive and repeated confirmation of TI’s creed amongst the 
members. Persistency and repetition of cliché and unverified assumptions has 
always been effective instrument of indoctrination. It is not necessary to 
discuss the implications of TI’s views, conceptions and activities with a 
critical mind, but to believe and replicate them. The Chairperson’s opening 
speech at the annual meeting is a very emotional occasion to reassure and 
reconfirm unified creed, i.e. the single-tone belief in the organisation’s 
mission. There are a series of taboo issues which neither TI-S nor NCs like to 
discuss openly: some are political, such as the relationship between TI and the 
neoliberal agenda of the World Bank and the IMF (Hindess 2004); some are 
financial and strategic, such as TI sponsoring by US corporations; others 
pertain to the domain of internal governance, such as, the future of PAM’s and 
the succession of Eigen; 
• The annual meeting is also an opportunity of communion amongst members 
and an occasion to welcome new ones to the fraternity. This encompasses a lot 
of back-slapping amongst peers, media projection and photo opportunities and 
the chance to meet and talk to the Chairman personally; 
• True communion with the “high cause” comes with the remembrance of those 
who died investigating or combating corruption while carrying out their 
professional duties through yet-another excellent TI public relations asset: the 
Posthumous Integrity Awards. The prize is part of the annual Integrity Awards 
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celebration/dinner, which was launched in 2000 “to honour individuals and 
organisations around the globe that are making a distinct difference in curbing 
corruption”. It does not really matter if the people awarded are not TI 
members. Since the programme’s goal is to give recognition to those “who 
work to investigate and unmask corruption often at great personal risk”, the 
likelihood of having a TI nomination is actually thin as both TI-S and NC 
members refrain from engaging into confrontation or investigation. During the 
2004 Nairobi AMM, the Posthumous Integrity Awards had considerable 
sentimental impact upon all present members and invited guests during the 
celebration dinner; 
• Another religiosity feature is the development of a special language, jargon 
and rhetoric (Sampson 2004). The interaction between TI-S and governmental, 
financial institutions and the business world (product of the so-called 
coalition-building strategy) and the model of bureaucratised organisation it 
sought for what was primarily intended to be “a global movement” (which is 
replicated down the ladder by NCs), forced TI to develop a common 
managerial language across all its members. TI-S staff and NCs ought to speak 
the same language whilst approaching a donor, developing a partnership or 
executing a project. The words “coalition-building”, “capacity-building”, 
“empowerment”, “stakeholder”, “good governance”, “sustainability” were 
recurrent during the various discussions with TI-S and NC officials and have a 
similar meaning across the whole organisation. 
 
 
 
6.1. Relations amongst NCs: the scope and feasibility of regional endeavours 
 
Relations amongst NCs are minimal. Regional endeavours are not encouraged or 
discarded by TI-S. They are essentially an initiative of NCs. In principle, regional 
groups are meant to converge NCs’ efforts and activities and transfer knowledge on a 
key number of priorities within a given region. In practice, however, there are no 
serious regional efforts of cooperation and coordination of joint ventures. Where there 
are pre-existing NGO communication and cooperation networks across neighbouring 
countries, such as with the TI-Latin America and Caribbean group (TILAC), regional 
endeavours can become useful instruments of knowledge transfer (given cross-
country institutional and cultural similarities); where such networks do not exist, 
regional coalitions are symbolic and they either serve as smokescreens for the lack of 
substance or any activity whatsoever by the majority of chapters or, at its best, to 
issue joint general statements and organise sporadic meetings. 
 
The European group is by far the largest (a total of 40 NCs), but Western Europe is 
often the least represented in TI’s meetings. Some European NCs are new and with 
little leverage within the organisation; some OECD countries are not yet covered, 
such as The Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Portugal. In the case of Portugal, there 
was an attempt to constitute a NC in the late 1990s, but it failed both due to bad 
management from some TI-S members at the time and inaction from the Portuguese 
candidates. TI also finds a more difficult ground to operate in some European 
countries were there is equally the same cynicism in regard to NGOs as there is for 
parties and their representatives, especially because European TI-NCs often resemble 
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private clubs constituted by “grey suit” people far from any common conception of 
“everybody’s” organisation. 
 
At the European level, communication between TI-S and NCs and amongst NCs 
themselves is still deficient. Eastern European NCs face important funding difficulties. 
Private donators are difficult to engage, either because they are linked to organised 
crime or simply have no sympathy for the role of NGOs. Collaboration with political 
and public authorities is not always cordial and easy to strike since the new breed of 
democratic leaders are yet learning out to collaborate with civil society actors, 
especially in sensitive issues such as the combat against corruption and corporate 
crime. 
 
During the European Group meeting at the 2004 Nairobi AMM, there were no 
conclusive collaborative endeavours. The German and British Chapters continue to 
form an entente uncritically in favour of TI-S global priorities. They act like the 
mandarins of the Board, the “yes President” people along with some African NC 
representatives, who have an undisputable allegiance to Eigen’s positions either 
because they are dependent on TI’s capacity to procure them money or because they 
nurture high expectations of being part of TI’s Establishment, even for a brief period, 
as members of the Board. The UK and German Chapters unsuccessfully attempted to 
convince other European NCs on the need to converge efforts on TI’s key global 
priorities, such as procurement. France was against UK’s downsizing of importance 
of political corruption. Much of the work carried out by TI-France has been 
concentrated on political financing, thanks to the precious collaboration of Yves-
Marie Doublet, a French expert on the field. Setting ethical principles to the private 
sector continued to be a priority to the Norwegian Chapter amidst the uncomfortable 
ordeals relating to the Chapter’s sponsoring by Statoil, Norway’s major oil company 
whose CEOs have recently been found guilty on charges of corruption. The 
relationship between NCs and donors 46  or, more importantly, the screening 
mechanisms in place to prevent association with “corrupt” businessmen and political 
figures, has not been adequately addressed. One issue of contention between TI-S and 
the Italian NC, which was not represented at the meeting, has been the handling of 
information about Mr Berlusconi, especially with regard to his recent corruption trials 
and his desperate attempt to muffle prosecution powers and magistrates’ 
independence through judicial reform. Moldavia raised the issue of not being able to 
strike a coalition building strategy with the presidential office or to sustain a 
campaign against the president’s preferential treatment of his son’s company in all 
major tendering processes without running the risk of hindering the chapter’s 
existence and activities. This alert was simply ignored, since no discussion followed 
on the panoply of engagement strategies available to NCs and how to adapt them to 
specific circumstances was simply ignored. 
 
Each NC has its own priorities and agenda, which do not necessarily reflect their 
country’s major issues of concern, but there is some room for future cross-chapter 
collaboration in common projects. Most NCs do not detract the possibility of 
cooperation and the need to promote common projects or, at least, some comparative 
work. Where close cultural bonds and similarity political and market structures exist, 
such as the case with the Latin American and Baltic countries, agreement on a broad 
common anticorruption agenda or the creation of a network of communication and 
collaboration may be feasible. Although all NCs agreed on the need to share 
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information and ensure “best practice” transfer across chapters, none have indicated 
how such objective could be attained. The lack of cooperation between NCs 
individually or through their regional groups with other regional policy networks is 
also another indicator of the low adaptability and knowledge transfer capacity of most 
NCs.47 The importance of ensuring some degree of responsibility of established NCs 
to help other Chapters in formation as a starting point for a more enduring cooperation 
has also been brought forward during the regional meetings. Unfortunately, regional 
solidarity amongst NCs remains wishful thinking: with punctual exceptions, 48 
divergences and tensions between NCs are greater than their collaborative endeavours. 
In the words of a NC executive director, ‘Regional coalitions are very hard to strike. 
The more objective one’s activity is, the less space there is for accommodation, the 
more space for disagreement is created, and the more probable is that dissent will 
appear. Differences of quality across NCs are also problematic to cope with’. In a less 
sceptical tone, he concludes that advantages in building regional coalitions of NCs are 
not excluded, ‘provided that such coalitions are possible’.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Today TI is represented in more than 80 countries of a variable nature: from tiny 
pacific islands states to colossal Russia, from developed to developing countries, from 
North, South, East and West, consolidated democracies and very imperfect ones, 
countries with high perceived levels of corruption such as Nigeria and countries with 
low perception levels of corruption such as Sweden. TI represents 40% of the political 
world as we know it today. Numbers are still growing, but the fourth wave of 
franchising takes place in a less favourable context – TI has lost much of its initial 
flair and shine – and under a more scrutinized and closed accession/membership 
process. 
 
The mode of franchising adopted by TI is quite puzzling for an organisation which 
pertains to be an embodiment of civil society. Its constituency resembles more the UN 
General Assembly than a movement of peoples. The decision to constitute single 
national units has more to do with its founding fathers’ lack of understanding of how 
a civil society movement ought to look and operate than a product of a carefully 
thought and designed strategy of membership. This resolution has had its gains and 
losses. On the one hand, TI has been able of acquiring a hegemonic position in the 
industry of anticorruption and to launch well-synchronised global actions of 
awareness-raising thanks to its strategy of franchising. On the other hand, it has 
converted the much ambitioned “movement” into a bureaucratic, conservative and 
resource draining organisation and lost touch with the dynamic nature of social reality, 
because it excludes individual membership/voice and other alternatives to the 
Chapters created (both in terms of more than one Chapter per country as well as the 
types of unit). In short, it excludes many valuable contributions. 
 
TI’s actions, priorities and strategies are replicated to a greater or lesser extent at the 
local level. Most NCs have not been able to define their priority areas and their major 
high profile activities are reduced to engaging in the synchronised symbolic initiatives 
put in place by TI-S every year, such as the launching of the CPI or the Global 
Corruption Report. The coalition-building strategy which TI induces NCs to adopt 
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vis-à-vis the political and business actors in their own countries can be more a liability 
than a success: by not ensuring the arms’ length distance from decision-makers and 
the corporate world, TI and its NCs compromise their independence, mission and 
objectives. Although some Chapters have put in place a balanced and sustainable 
system of financing, most depend on one source of donations which leaves their 
leaders at peril the independence and the integrity with considerable risk to TI’s 
“clean” image and reputation. Amidst the financial difficulties in which most NCs 
have to run their activities, the lack of financial transfers and insufficient management 
support from TI-S and their inability to attract and diversify sources of financing, for 
instance, through mass individual membership, leaves NCs in a fragile position vis-à-
vis their donors’ agenda, which may well be that of financing an anticorruption civil 
society actor in order to clean up their “dirty” image or to reinforce an anticorruption 
institutional rhetoric at the surface of a hidden neoliberal reform agenda. 
 
TI’s search for a constituency was not purely driven by the need to boost participation 
from below, to increase critical mass and knowledge about local problems and 
possible solutions or to broaden its territorial representation; it was also a strategy of 
adjustment to changing donor panorama. The reverse side of the medal is that as soon 
as enlarged membership and franchising were set on track, there was little TI-S could 
do to stop increasing demands from below for greater internal transparency, 
accountability and democratisation. TI-S faces important governance challenges 
ahead as numbers grow and its capacity to deliver both in financial as well as in 
innovative terms is less convincing.  
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1 ‘At mid-century, there were 22 democracies accounting for 31 percent of the world population and a 
further 21 states with restricted democratic practices, accounting for 11.9 percent of the globe’s 
population. By the close of our century liberal and electoral democracies clearly predominate, and have 
expanded significantly in the Third Wave, which has brought democracy to much of the post-
Communist world and to Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa. Electoral democracies now 
represent 119 of the 192 existing countries and constitute 58.2 percent of the world’s population. At the 
same time liberal democracies— i.e. countries Freedom House regards as free and respectful of basic 
human rights and the rule of law— are 85 in number and represent 38 percent of the global population’ 
(Freedom House Democracy's Century Report, 1999. Available online: 
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http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.pdf). 
 
2 ‘In 1992 international NGOs channelled over $7.6 billion of aid to developing countries. It is now 
estimated that over 15 percent of total overseas development aid is channelled through NGOs. While 
statistics about global numbers of NGOs are notoriously incomplete, it is currently estimated that there 
is somewhere between 6,000 and 30,000 national NGOs in developing countries. CBOs across the 
developing world number in the hundreds of thousands.’ World Bank website "Nongovernmental 
Organizations and Civil Society/Overview." 
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/NGOs/home> Accessed June 8, 2001 (no longer 
available). 
 
3 There are plenty of NGOs at the national level, from which TI can chose to develop partnerships or 
propose NC membership, but it has no real competitors in the global arena: once the briefcase issue 
was captured by TI and its brand consolidated, it would have been difficult for a new INGO to emerge 
and try to leapfrog TI’s monopoly in this domain. This does not mean that TI is the only INGO with an 
interest in corruption related issues. Global Witness and George Soros’ Open Society Institute, which 
were founded about the same time (1993) and with whom TI has collaborated regularly, have equally 
an interest in and, to an extent, a different understanding of corruption and anticorruption. 
 
4 For more information on Transparency International history and facts: www.transparency.org (2004) 
 
5 The fight against corruption is still mainly, if not mostly a national-based and national-oriented effort. 
Democracy is a territorial-based concept and if the fight against corruption is meant to improve its 
quality or ensure its normal functioning, it will have to play in its jurisdictional grounds, looking at the 
performance of its institutions, at the expectations of its citizens and the national leaders’ predisposition 
to do something about it. This has also to do with public opinion condemnation of corruption or its 
interest on reforms taken abroad. People show only limited concern about what has been done and how 
successful the combat against corruption has been in neighbouring countries. People may resort to 
stereotyped visions of foreign societies and political systems, which CPI has probably reinforced or 
simply crystallised, but remain largely indifferent to corruption and anti-corruption efforts elsewhere. 
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6 TI History, from the TI website: http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html 
 
7 The fact that TI was founded under the German Law of Associations is in great measure a practical 
decision related to Eigen’s central role in setting up the organisation. It would have been unwise to set 
up TI “headquarters” in the US, given the possible connotation it would immediately assume: it would 
immediately be regarded as an instrument of those US corporations pressing for a levelled playing field, 
that is an anti-bribery convention. There is no clear explanation, however, as why it was not founded in 
Britain, which had both a strong NGO tradition (Oxfam, Amnesty International) and one of the world’s 
major business centres (TI’s initial target), which leaves us only with the standardised version of 
making things easier for Eigen to start his vision of “some kind of organisation” to mobilise global 
concern against corruption. 
 
8 No website available (and no knowledge of date of adhesion from other sources): Austria (Nat’l Ct); 
Bahrain (Nat’l Ct); Belgium (NC); Benin (NC); Botswana (NC); Burkina Faso (Nat’l Ct); Burundi 
(Nat’l Ct); Cameroon (CH-IF); Chad (Nat’l Ct); China (Nat’l Ct); Côte d’Ivoire (Nat’l Ct); Dominican 
Republic (?); Egypt (?); Ethiopia (Nat’l Ct); Fiji (NC); Gabon (Nat’l Ct); Gambia (NC); Ghana (NC); 
Haiti (CH-IF); Honduras (?); Iran (?); Iraq (?); Jamaica (NC); Jordan (CH-IF); Kuwait (?); Kyrgyzstan 
(CH-IF); Mauritania (?); Mongolia (CH-IF); Montenegro (?); Mozambique (Nat’l Ct); Namibia (Nat’l 
Ct); Netherlands (CH-IF); New Zealand (NC); Niger (CH-IF);  Nigeria (NC); Russia (NC); Samoa 
(Nat’l. Ct); Singapore (Nat’l Ct); Slovenia (Nat’l Ct); Solomon (Nat’l Ct); Tanzania (NC); Togo (Nat’l 
Ct); Uganda (NC); Vanuatu (CH-IF); Yemen (CH-IF); Zambia (NC). Website but no date of adhesion 
specified: Estonia (NC); Finland (CH-IF); India (NC); Indonesia (NC); Kazakhstan (NC); Morocco 
(NC); Mauritius (NC); Spain (CH-IF); Sierra Leone (Nat’l Ct); Sri Lanka (NC). Website but no English 
version available at the time: Germany (NC); Japan (CH-IF); Republic of Macedonia (CH-IF); Norway 
(NC); Poland (NC); Russia (NC); Taiwan (NC). Website was not operational or working properly: 
Georgia (NC), Latvia (NC); Malaysia (NC); Pakistan (CH-IF); Sweden (CH-IF); Ukraine (NC); 
Zimbabwe (NC). 
 
9 National Chapter in Formation since November 2004. 
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10 TI NCs are free to organise themselves in the way they see fit and to define their own mandates and 
work programmes, but ‘they must follow two important rules of conduct: 1) they will not investigate 
and expose individual cases of corruption as such activity would undermine efforts to build coalitions 
which promote professional and technical improvements of anti-corruption systems; and 2) they must 
avoid party politics as partisan activity would damage TI’s credibility’ (TI Sourcebook 2000, Ch. 15). 
These two principles were agreed to by the initial NCs at the first AGM, in Quito, Ecuador, May 1994 
and constitute the membership acquis of TI. 
 
11 Association Algérienne de Lutte contre la corruption. 
 
12 Fundacíon Ética y Democracia. 
 
13 Probidad. 
 
14 “Creating change together towards a world free of corruption and TI’s Annual Membership Meeting”, 
9-10 October 2004, Nairobi, Kenya. The author of this article attended the meeting as an observer. 
 
15 Along with two other companies Hydro and Telenor, Statoil helped to set up the Norwegian chapter 
of Transparency International with a NOK 250,000 (=39,960.64 USD approximately). In June 2004, 
the Norwegian oil company Statoil was found guilty of attempted corruption in Iran relating to a 
business contract and agreed to pay a 20-million-kroner (2.97-million-dollar) fine imposed by the 
Norwegian Economic Crime Unit, Økokrim. Following these events, Statoil’s top three CEOs resigned 
and Jannik Lindbæk, previously chairman of the board in the bank DnB, and chairman of the board of 
TI Norway was appointed as the new Chairman of Statoil. His role as chairman of the Norwegian NC 
gave him the greatest leverage to patch up Statoil's torn image. 
 
16 Some NCs, like Brazil, reject the term headquarters to define TI-S. They see no hierarchical structure 
or binding bottom-up responsiveness, as highlighted in TI’s organisational Chart 
(http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/org_chart.html). In their own view, TI as a movement is a 
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horizontal accountability organisation and TI-S raison d’être is to serve NCs by aggregating critical 
mass, fostering the organisation’s capability to apply for funding and enabling intra-communication 
and coordination of activities. 
 
17 Poder Ciudadano. 
 
18 Corporación Latinoamericana para el Desarrollo (CLD). 
 
19 The current Managing Director of Corporación Latinoamericana para el Desarrollo (CLD). 
 
20 In late 1995, Vice President Dahik was forced to resign on corruption charges and fled to Costa Rica. 
 
21 TI History, from the TI website: http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html 
 
22 NCs are regulated under their own national laws and regulations, whilst their Chairpersons have legal 
status under German law as permanent (yet conditional) voting members of TI. 
 
23 Three seats in the Accreditation Committee are held by non-voting members of TI. 
 
24 Jeremy Pope had a contractual arrangement with TI-S which was renewed on a cycle. When time had 
come up, it was simply not renewed allegedly due to an incompatibility between him and Peter Eigen 
over various policy issues and strategies for the future of TI. Pope appealed to the ethics committee on 
the grounds that he believed his treatment as a member of TI was unethical, that he had not been 
provided with accurate information about what was going on, and why he was being terminated, and he 
was not provided with accurate information as to who it was that made the decision. There is no 
explanation for why or any apparent reason for the position that was taken by Peter Eigen, the then 
chairman of the Ethics Committee, Michael Vien, or the Board to that effect. The truth about Pope’s 
dismissal and appeal has not been properly disclosed to TI members, since no reference to that 
particular series of events was mentioned in the governance report of the Ethics Committee presented 
and discussed during the AGM in Nairobi. Moreover, the minutes of the Board of Directors are 
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confidential hence it is not possible to scrutinise the veracity of events and/or the policy decisions 
implicated. According to one of our interviewees, in response to Pope’s appeal, the terms of reference 
of the Ethics Committee were given a restricted interpretation: the Committee can review the activities 
of NC boards and staff and hear complaints from TI-S in Berlin, but cannot hear complaints with 
respect to the actions or the activities of the Board of Directors or its executive officers. This limited 
reading of the Committee’s competencies led to the resignation of one of its members. 
 
25 The “accreditation” or verification of credibility of PAMs is not properly regulated and it is largely 
dependent upon the discretion of the Board and its President. 
 
26 Evidence of that is the fact that a legal formula for open individual membership has not been 
seriously taken into consideration. 
 
27  TI Guidelines for the formation of National Chapters, from the TI website: 
http://www.transparency.org/contacting_ti/chapters/guidelines-overview.html 
 
28 Transparência Brasil is one of the few examples where the constituency (150 individual members) 
directly votes for candidates to the Board. TI-Brazil does not have any “special group” of “electors” 
controlling the organization as it happens with a large number of NCs and TI itself. 
 
29 Although figures ought to be read in proportion to the size of its population (around 180 million), 
Transparência Brasil has currently 150 individual members with voting capacity. The Convention, 
which is made up by all individual Associates (representatives of corporate members have no right to 
vote or to run as candidates) directly elects the Board. 
 
30 BBC World, Tuesday, 8 February, 2005 
 
31 Bribery is not the only persuasion technique known by corporations. Transparency/integrity can also 
be used by corporations as a persuasion technique, especially if some of the “activists” of NCs aspire 
elective office. 
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32 From the beginning of TI, USAID has funded several meetings and MC representatives to participate 
in the IACCs and TI annual meetings. The support was made an enormous difference to the 
institutionalisation and projection of TI. The impact of Eigen and TI at the international level has 
largely been dependent on that. 
 
33 The historical links between the Ford Foundation, a non-profit (tax-exempt) institution created by 
Henry and Edsel Ford in 1936 aimed to “promote progress in developing countries” and the CIA, have 
been object of academic research (Baber 2001; Saunders 2000; Berghahn 1999). During the Cold War 
period, the Ford Foundation was active in many international academic, cultural and political projects, 
some of which in partnership with the CIA. The fact that the Ford Foundation has been historically 
connoted as the cultural propaganda arm of the US foreign policy in developing regions raises 
suspicion with regard to the link between TI’s mission and the US State Department’s political agenda 
and poses sufficient problems to the organisation’s implantation and performance in countries 
unsympathetic or overtly hostile to the US. 
 
34 To mention a few: General Electrics, Enron, Lockheed Martin. For further information: 
http://www.transparency-usa.org/intro.html. 
 
35 The discrepancy between TI’s moral discourse and its funding practices highlights the same degree 
of incoherence as François Mitterrand’s condemnation of money in politics just before the unveiling of 
the series of illicit political financing scandals in France in the late 1980s or Craxi’s justification of 
illicit financing of the Italian party system as beneficial to democracy at the height of the Mani Pulite 
investigations. By the end of the century, as TI was losing much of its flair and novelty and the public 
was becoming more aware of its partners and modus operandi, the discrepancy words and actions, 
invoked values and actual performance was gradually questioned by the critical media and a handful of 
academics and opinion makers against the overall support and credibility the organisation had 
harvested in public opinion and academia. On 3 November 1999, the satirical French newspaper Le 
Canard enchaîné, published an daring article highlighting those dubious links between TI, CIA-prone 
foundations, and the US corporate world. Some months later, Le Monde Diplomatique, a French 
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newspaper published/distributed in different countries and targeting a centre-left, well-educated, 
middle-class readerhsip, would pick up the argument again with considerable damage to TI’s image 
in Europe: "[...] En témoigne le succès rencontré auprès des médias par la publication d’un indice 
annuel de cotation des pays corrupteurs et corrompus établi par Transparency International, association 
de lobbying, correspondante de la CIA et financée par des gouvernements et des entreprises, surtout 
américaines, expertes en la matière, telles Lockheed, Boeing, IBM, General Motors, Exxon, General 
Electric ou Texaco. Les campagnes anti-corruption, relayées par les organisations internationales 
(Banque mondiale, FMI, OCDE), n’ont d’autre objectif que la « bonne gouvernance » d’une 
criminalité financière désormais intégrée à la mondialisation des marchés, sous la houlette de la 
démocratie américaine, la plus corrompue de la planète. [...]" (Christian de Brie, ‘Dans l’archipel 
planétaire de la criminalité financière: Etats, mafias et transnationales comme larrons en foire’, Le 
Monde Diplomatique, Avril 2000, pp. 4-5). 
 
36 The three major Fixed Costs are: 1) rent of TI-S in Berlin (which is likely to be reduced in 2005 as TI 
is moving to cheaper accommodation); 2) rent of TI-UK; and 3) TI-S staff. 
 
37 One successful exception to the rule was the partnership TI-S and TI-Lebanon in applying for a large 
grant from the EC destined to the translation of the Source Book into Arabic. 
 
38 It should be noticed, however, that national regulations on associations can have an impact on the 
way NC’s organise and are able to diversify their sources of funding. For instance, in some countries, 
NCs have a charitable status, which allows for tax deduction of donor contributions (and hence attracts 
private funding); in other countries, their voluntary association status precludes them from receiving 
public aid and forces them to rely on private means of financing (individual fees or donations). 
 
39 For the Palestine NC, US funding would be intolerable to the majority of Palestinians and would put 
to ground the organisation. However, the Chapter is largely funded by other Western donors. Foreign 
money comes from UNDP for Palestine, Scandinavian aid agencies, the British Council (for the 
resource centre, books and website), and German foundations, such as Konrad Adenauer. 
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40 In 2000, Poder Ciudadano initiated an ethics monitoring project of monitoring in the Argentinean 
Congress following the consecutive waves of corruption and mismanagement scandals which led the 
countries to its deepest political and economic crisis (“El Congreso bajo la lupa 2004 - Informe anual 
del monitoreo cívico de Poder Ciudadano”). 
 
41 During the 2004 Nairobi AGM, TI-S together with TI-Kenya and the Kenyan government (more 
precisely the Governance and Ethics Office of the Presidency, through his permanent secretary John 
Githongo, who had previously been a senior officer of TI-Kenya) have pushed for a new folkloric 
instrument (already has a logo!) based on the so-called coalition-building strategy: “New Anti-
Corruption Governments: The Challenge of Delivery”. The New Governments Fighting Corruption is 
to be constituted as a network of new incumbents with an anticorruption manifesto. In other words, the 
anticorruption agenda promised to their electorate, during the last elections, has to be put into practice 
once in office… hence “the challenge of delivery”. 
 
42 See, for example, Martin Tisné and Daniel Smilov (2004) From the Ground Up: Assessing the 
Record of Anticorruption Assistance in Southeastern Europe, Budapeste: CEU Press. 
 
43 One of the acquis requisites set under the Guidelines for NCs is that they should not engage in 
investigation of corruption cases. The acquis is not binding (i.e. no enforcement form TI), but it is 
meant to work as a sufficient disincentive for NCs to enter into activities that could put at risk the 
whole organisation or the chapter activities. So far, very few NCs have defied house rules. Recently, TI 
Pakistan has announced its intention to start a program on “Investigating Corrupt Practices by Public 
Officials Hindering Private-sector Development”. In reality, however, this program is about assessing 
‘corrupt practices, non-transparent, non-friendly ever-changing laws, rules, regulations, Duties and 
Taxes many of them being of colonial heritage and above all the menace of extortion by Public 
officials hindering Private Sector Development’. 
 
44 Such as those previously framed by Jeremy Pope and Fredrik Galtung, the creators of the two pillar 
instruments which gave substance to TI: the National Integrity Systems and the CPI, respectively. 
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45 For example, TI Croatia, TI Estonia, TI Moldavia and TI Macedonia. 
 
46  The issue of corporate members was brought to the table by the chairperson (TI-S member 
responsible for Europe), but no discussion followed apart from mentioning that some chapters, such as 
TI-France, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark have corporate members. 
 
47 The need to link the MENA Group to the Euro-MED network was suggested by the executive 
director of TI-Lebanon during the Nairobi regional meeting. 
 
48 For instance, TI Bosnia-Herzegovina is working close to the Italian NC, which has provided them 
some initial funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2003 the Strategic Framework for the TI Movement (http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html) 
Diagram 1. “TI over 10 years”: the consolidation of an anticorruption brand 
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  Convention enters into force 
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2000 
• First Annual TI Integrity Awards 
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  Colombia, Argentina, Italy, Korea and 
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2001 
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• First Global Corruption Report 
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  American Convention Against  
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2002 
• Publish What You Pay campaign 
• Business Principles for Countering Bribery 
2003 
• UN Convention 
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Table 2. Global Priorities and Domestic Concerns (by region) 
TI 
Lebanon
 
(NC) 
TI 
Palestine 
 
(NC) 
TI 
UK 
 
(NC) 
TI 
Switzerland
 
(NC) 
TI 
Tanzania 
 
(NC) 
TI 
South 
Africa
(NC) 
TI 
Brazil
 
(NC) 
TI 
Argentina 
 
(NC) 
TI 
Australia 
 
(NC) 
TI 
PNG 
 
(NC) 
TI 
Pakistan
 
(NC) 
TI 
Thailand
 
(NC) 
TI 
Canada 
 
(NC) 
TI 
USA 
 
(NC) 
 
Middle East 
 
Europe Africa Latin America Oceania & Pacific Asia North America 
Waves of 
membership 
II IV  I II - II III I - - II II II I 
Global priorities                
Political corruption    ●  ○  ● ●  ●   ○  
Public procurement 
corruption 
●     ●  ● ● ● ● ●   ● 
Corporate 
crime/ethics 
●   ● ● ●  ● ○ ●   ● ● ● 
Anticorruption 
conventions 
   ● ● ●  ● ● ●  ●  ● ● 
Additional global 
priorities 
               
Securing access to 
information 
● ●      ● ●  ● ● ● ●  
Measuring corruption     ●   ●    ●   ○ 
Combating money 
laundering and 
supporting recovery 
of assets 
    
● 
  
● 
        
● 
 
● 
Fostering 
anticorruption 
education and ethics 
 
● 
 
● 
       
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
○ 
 
Accountability of 
CSOs and preventing 
corruption in 
development 
cooperation 
    
● 
      
● 
  
● 
  
 
 
Tackling corruption 
in specific industries 
and sectors 
 
● 
 
● 
  
● 
 
○ 
     
● 
   
● 
●  
Domestic concerns                
Democratisation and 
citizenship 
 ●    ● ●  ●  ●     
Access to and 
performance of 
justice apparatus 
  
● 
      
● 
 
● 
   
● 
   
Complaint systems  ●          ●    
Attitude surveys        ●    ●  ●  
E-governance        ●    ○    
Annex 1 
Good governance ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●     ●  
Post-war 
reconstruction 
●               
Empowering Youth ●            ●   
Institutional, 
legislative and 
constitutional 
anticorruption reform 
(NIS diagnosis) 
 
● 
 
● 
  
● 
    
● 
  
● 
 
● 
 
● 
  
● 
 
Privatisation 
processes 
           ○    
Local government  ●          ●    
Nepotism and 
favouritism public 
service 
 ●              
Depoliticising public 
service 
          ●     
Corruption and 
Poverty 
 ●     ●   ●    ●  
Regional / 
international scope 
● ●  ●     ● ●    ● ● 
Security  ●  ● ●         ●  
Whistleblowing ●    ○     ● ● ●    
Conditionality in aid 
and debt relief 
   ●            
Bank secrecy laws     ●           
Source: Andrea Figari (TI-S staff) and NCs websites. 
Legend: ● active/engaged 
○ interested/newly engaged 
 
 
